Africa's Bargaining Power: A Crucial Summit for EU-AU Relations
Can Africa assert its voice and influence at the upcoming EU-AU summit? This week's gathering in Luanda holds immense significance, especially regarding the delicate issue of peace and security cooperation.
On November 24th and 25th, leaders from the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU), two global powerhouses, will meet in Angola's capital. This summit marks a quarter-century since their inaugural gathering in Cairo, highlighting the enduring nature of their partnership.
While the partnership covers trade, climate, development, and health, the peace and security pillar has faced challenges. In today's fragmented international landscape, where the EU aims to establish itself as a distinct geopolitical force, this summit becomes a critical juncture to reaffirm multilateralism's value.
Since the May ministers' meeting on the 2030 Joint Vision, the partnership has gained momentum. The lengthy Joint Communiqué emphasizes shared peace and security concerns, the need for ongoing dialogue on specific crises, and strengthening Africa's peace architecture.
However, progress at this week's summit may be hindered by the persistent rhetoric of a 'partnership among equals.' Given the inherent power imbalance between the two organizations, with the EU's significant financial and institutional might, the AU faces a challenge in increasing its bargaining power.
But here's where it gets controversial...
The tensions are most apparent in peace and security, especially regarding funding for African-led interventions. The EU has been the primary external financial supporter of the AU in this regard, showcasing its commitment to a safer Africa. However, Europe's own security environment has shifted with the Ukraine war and a fragile transatlantic partnership.
This led to the EU's transition from the African Peace Facility to the European Peace Facility in 2021. While the former focused on empowering African institutions, the latter allows the EU more flexibility in pursuing its global security interests. As a result, African priorities now compete with Europe's other concerns.
The EU's increased flexibility means it can directly engage with African regional organizations, member states, and military coalitions, effectively bypassing the AU. While the AU still receives significant support, the EU has positioned itself as a more autonomous player in Africa.
The AU could have influenced the EU's transition during the legislative process, but administrative shortcomings led to a missed opportunity.
And this is the part most people miss...
Beyond financing, the AU and EU have differing security perspectives. The African agenda focuses on state legitimacy, reducing marginalization, and improving governance. While the EU supports these goals, its priorities are counter-terrorism and combating foreign interference.
Africa's evolving security landscape and its gradual shift away from institutional approaches to conflict further complicate matters. The AU's role in authorizing and deploying peace operations has diminished, with sub-regional coalitions taking the lead. Interventions like the G5 Sahel and SADC missions in Mozambique and the DRC reflect this shift towards more short-term, crisis-specific responses.
The global geopolitical environment also impacts EU-AU cooperation. Africa's security landscape now involves a struggle for influence among external actors like China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf States, often displacing traditional European partners.
Russia, in particular, exemplifies these tensions. While discussed in AU-EU meetings, it rarely appears in formal communiqués. It was euphemistically referred to as a 'third state' associated with mercenaries in the Sahel in the October meeting of the EU Political and Security Committee and AU Peace and Security Council.
As an EU official put it, 'Aligning European security priorities with African realities remains a challenge.'
The Luanda Summit is a chance for African and European leaders to align their peace and security commitments based on shared challenges and values. A key indicator will be the EU's response to the AU's discussion paper, signaling Addis Ababa's desire for a more strategic dialogue.
Success will be measured by progress towards predictable funding, finding a balance between power asymmetries, and reaffirming the AU's coordinating role in African security.
The AU-EU partnership is deep and comprehensive, but its full potential relies on both sides agreeing on a practical approach suited to today's complex and fragmented world.
